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Lost Chance for Peace
The 1945 CCP-Kuomintang Peace Talks Revisited
✣ Sergey Radchenko
This article reconsiders the 1945 Chongqing peace talks between the Kuo-
mintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). These talks—in
particular, meetings between Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and CCP Chair-
man Mao Zedong—paved the way to the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949)
and for this reason have been the subject of extensive study by Chinese, Tai-
wanese, and Western historians. The main questions to consider are whether
the talks were a missed opportunity for averting the civil war and, if so, why
the two sides failed to come to terms. One answer would be to apply the an-
cient Chinese adage that two tigers cannot live on one mountain. One or the
other had to give, and no agreements could have mattered in the eat-or-be-
eaten struggle of the two political titans, Chiang and Mao. Another answer
would be to resort to the blanket term of “ideology.” Mao was as commit-
ted to the success of Communist revolution, the argument goes, as Chiang
was committed to preventing it. The ideological rift between the KMT and
the CCP was put aside for the duration of a national emergency, the Sino-
Japanese war, but it was never healed. The end of war heralded the ostensibly
inevitable resumption of the KMT-CCP struggle for supremacy.
Yet, explanations relying on historical determinism gloss over the range
of options open to policymakers, applying retrospective coherence to open-
ended situations that were anything but clear to those directly involved. When
Chiang and Mao met for their fateful parley in August–October 1945, the
future—the war, CCP victories, the division of China—were months and
years away. It is important to consider how the two leaders perceived this
future, and why they could not achieve a lasting compromise. Depending on
the answers to these questions, scholars may need to revisit the relationship
between ideology and power and disentangle propaganda and policy. It is also
important to understand the relative weight of internal and external factors in
the unfolding civil war. Is it fair, for instance, to say that the Chinese Com-
munist revolution had an internal dynamic that would play out irrespective
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of the external environment? A CCP-centered approach may support such an
interpretation, but it is also clear that no matter how isolated the Commu-
nists felt in their remote base in Yan’an, they were never really isolated from
the broader international environment and were shaped by, and contributed
to the shaping of, the Cold War.
Another important reason to reconsider the 1945 peace talks is the much
greater availability of archival evidence. This is not because of a sudden tor-
rent of new materials. The release of relevant documentation has been a slow
and ongoing process, starting with the first installments of declassified doc-
uments in the U.S. State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States
series in the 1970s. In the 1980s the Republic of China (ROC), in Taiwan,
released large batches of important documents, and in the 1990s the Com-
munist government of the mainland People’s Republic of China (PRC) be-
gan putting out various official sets of collected writings, chronologies, and
memoirs. Over the past quarter century, rich collections of Soviet documents
have become accessible in Moscow. Quantity has turned to quality, provid-
ing historians with an invaluable, multi-country resource base with which to
reassess long-debated events of the twentieth century. This article draws on
the new materials to show that the Chongqing talks actually did represent an
important “lost chance” for peace. Peace did not materialize because Mao and
Chiang were at odds about the future of China. Chiang Kai-shek could not
accept Mao’s pragmatic offer to divide the country, leaving the CCP in con-
trol of the north and the KMT preponderant in the south. For Chiang, such a
scenario was unacceptable ideologically, morally, and emotionally. It was also
unnecessary, for, as he saw it, full victory was within grasp.
Mao’s Road to Chongqing
No one expected Japan to surrender as quickly as it did. In early 1945, even
as Adolf Hitler’s armies were tottering on the brink of defeat in Europe, Allied
victory in Asia seemed years away. At a remote outpost in Yan’an, Mao had
not yet had the opportunity to work out a detailed action plan for the postwar
period. Most observers expected that the civil war—in a state of suspension
since the establishment of the Second CCP-KMT United Front—would re-
sume. The CCP was prepared for this eventuality, having built up a strong
base in Shaanxi Province and in other base areas across China, controlling in
Mao’s estimate a population of some 95 million people. Internally, Mao con-
solidated his leadership over the party during the brutal “rectification” cam-
paign of 1942–1944. In April–June 1945 the CCP held its Seventh Congress,
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the first to enshrine “Mao Zedong Thought” in the party constitution. Mao’s
report to the congress dwelt on the coming struggle with the KMT and the
endpoint of this struggle: the abolition of the KMT government and estab-
lishment of a “New Democracy” under the leadership of the working class.1
The exact terms of this struggle were yet to be worked out. The ongoing war
with Japan overshadowed preparations for the civil war. As late as 4 August
1945, CCP leaders still estimated that the war against the “Japanese bandits”
would last until at least the winter of 1946, at which point a civil war would
“inevitably” follow.2
The U.S. bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August 1945,
and the Soviet entry into the war on 8 August radically changed the situa-
tion. Within days Emperor Hirohito announced Japan’s surrender. Japanese
forces in Manchuria put up little resistance to a last-minute Soviet offensive.
The rapidly changing situation caused confusion among CCP leaders, forcing
a rethink of postwar strategy. As Zhou Enlai, already a senior CCP official,
noted at the time, “The end of the war and the Japanese capitulation were
for us very sudden and unexpected events. We had absolutely no idea that
the finale to the war would come so quickly.” Another senior cadre recalled,
“America dropped the atomic bomb, the Soviet Union sent forces, hastening
Japan’s capitulation. The coming of victory was very sudden, even though
the Seventh Congress made preparations for it.”3 The most startling thing for
CCP leaders, however, was not that Japan surrendered more quickly than ex-
pected but that the ROC and the Soviet Union signed a new treaty of alliance
on 14 August 1945. The treaty committed the USSR to “close and friendly
cooperation” with the KMT, which the CCP had until then denounced as a
“reactionary clique.” Mao’s plans for the “abolition” of the KMT government
were almost impossible to reconcile with what appeared to be Iosif Stalin’s
recognition of the Nationalist government’s legitimacy.
Mao was unaware of the extent of the Sino-Soviet discussions that led to
the conclusion of the 1945 treaty, which stemmed from decisions taken at the
February 1945 Yalta Conference committing the Soviet Union to participate
in the war against Japan in exchange for certain gains in the Far East. Many of
these gains were in direct violation of China’s sovereignty. Chiang Kai-shek,
who was not consulted, fumed in his diary, “I did not recognize the Yalta
1. See Mao Zedong, “On Coalition Government,” in Mao Zedong Selected Works, Vol. 3 (Beijing:
Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 255.
2. Chen Jian and Zhang Shu Guang, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: New
Documentary Evidence, 1944–1950 (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1996), p. 26.
3. Hu Qiaomu, Hu Qiaomu Huiyi Mao Zedong (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1994), p. 81.
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[decisions]. I did not participate. I have no responsibility [for the decisions].
Why should I carry [them] out? They [the allies] really see China as their
vassal.”4 In the end, though, he had to give in to Stalin’s demands, including
China’s recognition of Mongolia’s independence, joint Sino-Soviet ownership
of a major railroad in Manchuria, and Soviet control of the base of Port Arthur
(Lüshun) at the tip of the Liaodong Peninsula. As a quid pro quo, Stalin
promised to support the Kuomintang as the sole government of China.
Stalin’s promise had far-reaching consequences. Until the summer of
1945 the Soviet leader’s strategy in China was to weaken the central gov-
ernment’s control over its northern frontiers by supporting anti-government
forces. For instance, in Xinjiang Stalin provided weapons and even manpower
to a Uighur-Kazakh insurgency. By late 1944, with Soviet support, the rebels
had established control over northern Xinjiang, proclaiming the establishment
of the Republic of Eastern Turkestan. However, in mid-1945 Moscow reversed
course and phased out material support for the insurgency (all Soviet troops
and most types of non-Chinese arms and ammunition were withdrawn from
the rebels by 20 October) while actively pressuring insurgent leaders to be-
gin negotiations with the KMT, leading by 6 June 1946 to a peace agreement
that preserved Xinjiang as part of China.5 Stalin’s remarkable about-face in
Xinjiang revealed that he valued a stable relationship with the Chinese gov-
ernment based on solid gains recognized at Yalta and that he did not shy away
from direct pressure on his clients whose dreams of national liberation were
something that Stalin, in the end, really cared nothing about.
Stalin’s approach to the CCP underwent a similar transformation. Dur-
ing the secret negotiations of the Sino-Soviet treaty in July–August 1945 Stalin
repeatedly assured Chiang’s envoy, the President of the Executive Yuan, T. V.
Soong (Song Ziwen), that the Soviet Union would support the central gov-
ernment. “We consider [that] China has one government,” Stalin said. “As to
Communists in China we do not support [them] and don’t intend to support
them.” He spoke about the Chinese Communists in a positive vein, calling
them “good patriots” even as he questioned their Communist credentials.6
4. Wang Jianlang, “Xinren de liushi: Cong Jiang Jieshi riji kan kangzhan houqi de zhongmei guanxi,”
Jindai Shi Yanjiu, No. 3 (2009), p. 62.
5. The best accounts are Dzhamil’ Gasanly, Sintszyan v orbite sovetskoi politiki: Stalin i musul’manskoe
dvizhenie v Vostochnom Turkestane (1931–1949) (Moscow: FlintaNauka, 2015); and V. A.
Barmin, Sintzyan v sovetsko-kitaiskikh otnosheniyakh (Barnaul, Russia: Barnaulskii Gosudarstven-
nyi Pedagogicheskii Universitet, 1999), pp. 90–112. See also the Xinjiang documents collection
at http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/234/china-and-the-soviet-union-in-xinjiang-1934
-1949.
6. See, for example, Conversation between T. V. Soong and Stalin, 2 July 1945, Chinese version, in
Hoover Institution Archives (HIA), T. V. Soong Papers, Folders 6–9. For the Russian version, see
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Stalin encouraged the KMT to begin negotiations with the CCP and other
“democratic” forces in China. The Soviet draft of the Sino-Soviet statement
included a passage about national unity and “democratization,” though it was
opposed by the Chinese delegation on the grounds that it entailed interfer-
ence in China’s internal affairs. Stalin grumbled that the KMT were unwilling
to “democratize.” “The Chinese Communists will curse us!” he said, but he
agreed to drop the passage.7
Stalin evidently wanted a face-saving formulation to counter CCP accu-
sations of a sell-out but did not deem it important enough to insist on it in
ways he did with matters that had a more direct bearing on Soviet interests in
Asia. It is likely that Stalin’s main interest with the CCP was to have the Com-
munists take part in a coalition government that would give the Soviet Union
a degree of indirect influence on the KMT’s policies. He did not think Mao
would stand a chance in a general military showdown with Chiang. As for the
possibility of having two governments in China—effectively dividing China
and leaving Communist areas under Communist control—Stalin thought the
idea “stupid.”8 An additional agreement signed alongside the 14 August treaty
committed the Soviet Union to hand Manchuria to the KMT, effectively un-
dercutting the CCP’s efforts to extend political and military control over the
Chinese northeast. Although some scholars have claimed that Stalin from the
start intended to allow a “fraternal party”—the CCP—to govern Manchuria
on Moscow’s behalf in order to maintain the region as a de facto Soviet protec-
torate, there is no credible evidence to support this interpretation.9 Of course,
Stalin wanted to maintain influence in Manchuria, but the Yalta framework
already allowed that without any involvement of the “good patriots,” the CCP.
A few days after the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, even before the text
of the treaty was published in the press, Stalin informed Mao that the CCP
would have to change its policy. On 18 August Georgi Dimitrov (former head
of the Comintern) wrote in his diary that he and the former Soviet ambassador
in China, Aleksandr Panyushkin, were supposed to draft a telegram telling the
Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitskaya, and Vladimir Myasnikov, Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya, Vol. 4,
Book 2, 1945 (Moscow: Pamyatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2000), p. 73.
7. Conversation between T. V. Soong and Stalin, 10 August 1945, Chinese version, in HIA, T. V.
Soong papers, Folders 6–9. For a more detailed discussion, see Dieter Heinzig, The Soviet Union and
Communist China 1945–1950: The Arduous Road to the Alliance (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2004),
pp. 59–69.
8. Conversation between W. Averell Harriman and Iosif Stalin, 27 August 1945, in U.S. Department
of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, Vol. VII, p. 454 (hereinafter referred to as FRUS,
with appropriate year and volume numbers).
9. Heinzig, The Soviet Union and Communist China, p. 78.
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CCP to negotiate with the KMT in view of the “radically changed” situation.
The telegram, of which the full text has not yet been found, reportedly said
that were a civil war to break out in China it would put the Chinese nation “in
danger of destruction.” Mao, his long-time Russian interpreter later recalled,
scoffed at the suggestion: “I don’t believe that. The people are struggling for
emancipation. How can a nation be destroyed?”10 The telegram was likely re-
ceived in Yan’an on 20 August, and there are indications that Mao rejected
it. In any case, within days the Soviet leader sent another telegram, which,
oddly—probably to emphasize Stalin’s annoyance—replaced Stalin in the first
person with a royal “we, the Russians” and was signed “the Central Commit-
tee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks).” In this telegram, Stalin
again asserted that civil war would ruin the chances of China’s reconstruction
and therefore “advised” that Mao “meet Chiang Kai-shek and come to terms
with him.”11
In the meantime, on 14 August Chiang sent Mao a cable inviting him
to Chongqing for talks.12 U.S. Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley, who saw Chi-
ang the following evening, reported to Washington that the Generalissimo
appeared satisfied with Stalin’s promise to back the central government. Hur-
ley predicted that if Mao accepted Chiang’s invitation, “the armed conflict
between the Communist Party of China and the National Government may
be reduced to a political controversy. . . . The logic of events would seem
to indicate this result,” unless of course the CCP got hold of the Japanese
weapons.13 Chiang shared this latter concern, writing on 16 August that the
most urgent task was “to get rid of the weapons of the puppet regime quickly
so that the [Communist] traitors cannot use them.” These were not idle con-
cerns insofar as the CCP had made efforts to receive Japanese capitulation,
even issuing a special instruction to the liberated areas on 11 August to “force
the puppets to surrender to us.”14 From Chiang’s standpoint, the most impor-
tant thing was “to mobilize all levels of the society to respond to the call for
10. Ivo Banac, ed., The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933–1949 (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2003), p. 379; and Shi Zhe, Zai Lishi Juren Shenbian: Shi Zhe Huiyilu (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian
Chubanshe, 1992), p. 308.
11. Cable, CC CPSU to Mao Zedong, n.d. (late August 1945). A copy was kindly provided to me by
Alexander Pantsov. See also Alexander Pantsov and Steven Levine, Deng: A Revolutionary Life (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 121–122.
12. Full text in Zhuo Zhaoheng, Chongqing Tanpan Ziliao (Chengdu, China: Sichuan Renmin
Chubanshe, 1980), pp. 4–5.
13. Hurley to Department of State, 15 August 1945, in FRUS, 1945, Vol. 7, p. 446.
14. Instruction, CCP Central Committee, “The Party’s Tasks after Japan’s Surrender,” partial trans-




solidarity and unity in order to attack the sinners and cheaters plotting armed
rebellion.”15 Inviting Mao to Chongqing was from the start a public relations
exercise rather than a serious attempt to negotiate peace with the Commu-
nists, which was why Chiang’s invitation was immediately published in the
government newspaper.
Mao realized what Chiang was driving at. On 16 August he drafted a ca-
ble in the name of the commander of the Communist forces, Zhu De, outlin-
ing six points to prevent a civil war in China, claiming that the CCP had done
most of the fighting in the war (which was patently untrue), should therefore
receive Japanese capitulation in the nineteen “liberated areas” in which Com-
munist forces were present—from Manchuria in the north to Guangdong in
the south—and should even be allowed to send a delegation to the United
Nations (UN) peace conference. “You and your government have aroused the
dissatisfaction of the people and cannot represent the broad masses,” the cable
read.16 Mao sent another telegram to Chongqing on the same day, saying he
wanted Zhu De’s points answered before he would discuss any possible meet-
ing with the Generalissimo. “To summarize the recent gestures and arrogant
attitude of the CCP toward the authority [junzuo], they have resolved to take
advantage of the chaotic situation and openly betray the country,” Chiang
commented on the same day, deciding, for the moment, to “ignore” Zhu De’s
telegram.17
Four days later, on 20 August, Chiang issued Mao another public invita-
tion. Stalin’s secret telegrams urging Mao to negotiate came in at just about
this time. This development created a whole new dynamic. Mao could spar
with Chiang—he had been doing that for months—but pressure from Stalin
was a different matter.
On 22 August, under Soviet pressure, the CCP Central Military Com-
mission issued an instruction to all local party committees and military dis-
tricts, “On the Change of Strategic Direction.” This document spelled out the
hard truth: “The Soviet Union, constrained by the Sino-Soviet Treaty and for
the purpose of maintaining peace in the Far East, cannot help us.” Moreover,
“neither the United States nor the Soviet Union wants to see a civil war in
China.” This was presented as something of an advantage for the CCP insofar
as it meant that the Kuomintang was not in a position to unleash a civil war
immediately. Hence, the strategy would be to engage in talks with the KMT
15. Wang Zhenghua, ed., The Chiang Kai-shek Collections: The Chronological Events (62): August–
September 1945 (Taipei: Guoshiguan, 2011), p. 210 (hereinafter referred to as Shilüe Gaoben, Vol. 62).
16. Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong Selected Works, Vol. 4, p. 36.
17. Shilüe Gaoben, Vol. 62, p. 210.
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under the slogans of “peace, democracy, and unity,” while consolidating con-
trol over the nineteen liberated areas and expanding the Communist presence
in the big cities “to mobilize the masses, to win over the puppet troops, to
publish newspapers [and] to develop our secret service.”18 A comparison with
the set of instructions Mao had sent out to his military commanders ten days
earlier, on 11–12 August, shows a remarkable about-face. Back then he wanted
rapid expansion of the “liberated areas” and takeover of big cities across cen-
tral and eastern China, whereas now the emphasis shifted to controlling “the
vast countryside” and leaving large cities and, for the most part, large trans-
portation arteries in the hands of the Kuomintang.
On 23 August the Standing Committee of the Politburo discussed the
new situation. Mao made a grim, subdued speech. “The Soviet Union,” he
reiterated, “is not in a position to assist us.” Chiang had the upper hand: with
control of the big cities. He had accepted Japan’s surrender and was China’s
“legitimate leader.” The CCP also had certain advantages, controlling “pow-
erful liberated regions” and enjoying high standing in public opinion because
of a successful record of “promoting democracy and improving people’s liveli-
hood.” At the close of the meeting Mao made a remarkable announcement:
“We must prepare to make certain concessions to gain a position of legiti-
macy, to use the podium of the National Congress to go on attack. We really
need this kind of opportunity to educate the people of the entire country and
to exercise ourselves.” He explained that if Chiang decided to fight “we will
fight him” but if he stopped “we will also stop.” Mao added: “We will con-
tinue to try to wash Chiang Kai-shek’s face but not to cut off his head.”19
The meeting also discussed what kinds of demands the CCP should now
put forward, adopting the “Proclamation on the Current Situation” (pub-
lished on 27 August). This proclamation emphasized the new CCP line of
“peace, unity, and democracy” and called for a coalition government with
the KMT.20 The civil war that only weeks earlier appeared inevitable now
receded.
The “Proclamation on the Current Situation,” adopted on 23 August,
differed from the demands Mao had presented to Chiang just days earlier.
For instance, the CCP no longer insisted on being represented at a postwar
18. Chen and Zhang, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy; amended translation. Compare Zhongyang
Dang’anguan, Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji, Vol. 15 (Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang Dan-
gxiao Chubanshe, 1991), pp. 243–244.
19. Chen and Zhang, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, pp. 31–32.
20. For the text of the proclamation, see Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji, Vol. 15, pp. 247–249.
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UN conference dealing with the fate of Japan.21 This was very much in line
with Mao’s decision to “recognize the reality” of Chiang’s legal position. In
his remarks at the Standing Committee meeting, Zhou stressed that the CCP
would have to make additional concessions if the peace talks were to succeed,”
adding that, “of course, we cannot lose ground.”22 The CCP was thus begin-
ning to formulate its bottom line in the talks with the KMT. The next few
days would show just how far the Communists were willing to go in reaching
compromise.
At the meeting, Mao announced his intention to meet with Chiang in
Chongqing.23 Circumstantial evidence suggests that Mao was extremely con-
cerned about his safety in Chongqing, fearing—not unreasonably given the
KMT’s unsavory record in this regard—that if he were to go he would be assas-
sinated. For this reason, on 22 August Mao responded to Chiang with an offer
to send Zhou Enlai first. “I will conduct reconnaissance,” Zhou explained on
the following day. “The most important thing is to see what Chiang has on his
plate.”24 But that clearly was not enough for Chiang. Hurley, who discussed
the matter with the Generalissimo, wrote that Zhou “apparently has never
had any authority to act. He has authority only to confer.”25 Chiang cabled
Yan’an on the same day, insisting that Mao come along as well.26 Mao was
trapped: he could refuse to go, giving Chiang a reason to say the Communists
wanted war. This would not be good for Mao’s standing with “progressive”
public opinion. Such a scenario would also anger Stalin, who had insisted on
negotiations and whose support the CCP continued to value. Mao resisted
to the last, cabling Chiang on 24 August to send the plane—Zhou would go
first and then Mao would come “immediately after.”27 But the following day,
after another agonizing discussion, Mao resolved to take the risk. In the end,
he had very little choice.
Mao’s personal secretary, Hu Qiaomu, recalled that ahead of Mao’s depar-
ture for Chongqing the atmosphere in Yan’an was “very nervous.” “Many of
21. The first draft of the proclamation, authored by Zhou Enlai, still contained this proposition. See
Zhou Enlai Xuanji, Vol. 1 (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1980), pp. 221–222.
22. Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 1898–1949 (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1998), p. 630.
23. Chen and Zhang, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, p. 32.
24. Jin Chongji et al., Zhou Enlai Zhuan, 1898–1949, Vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chuban-
she, 1998), p. 728.
25. Draft cable, Albert Wedemeyer to Ivan Yeaton, 24 August 1945, in University of Oklahoma,
Patrick J. Hurley Papers, Box 96, Folder 12.
26. The text of Chiang Kai-shek’s telegram is in Zhuo Zhaoheng, Chongqing Tanpan Ziliao, pp. 7–8.
27. Zhuo Zhaoheng, Chongqing Tanpan Ziliao, p. 5.
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the cadres were scared out of their wits.”28 Mao himself put on a brave show.
“There is not much danger involved,” he said at the Politburo on 23 Au-
gust, reiterating three days later: “One has to be fully aware of the possibility
that Chiang Kai-shek will force me to sign an agreement under duress [cheng-
xiazhimeng] but he still needs my signature. . . . If I am put under house arrest,
that’s nothing to be afraid of. I can then handle some matters there.”29
Mao was not taking any chances, however. Already on 25 August Zhou
began calling Chongqing to make arrangements for the Chinese leader’s secu-
rity and bodyguards.30 “Mao Zedong is concerned about questions of personal
security at the talks,” Petr Vlasov (Vladimirov), Stalin’s operative in Yan’an,
noted on 26 August. “He believes that Chiang Kai-shek’s invitation is a trap
and is concerned for his life.”31 Mao even asked Vlasov to obtain Stalin’s guar-
antee for his personal safety while he was in Chongqing, requesting that the
Soviet military mission in Chongqing give him asylum in case of need. Vlasov
confirmed that Mao would be safe. “Chiang Kai-shek will not dare to make
an attempt on his life. This is Moscow’s firm guarantee.”32 It is unlikely that
Mao believed any such firm guarantee. Even Stalin later acknowledged that
Mao’s trip to Chongqing was “dangerous” for the Chinese leader.33
In the meantime, appropriate guarantees were also offered by the United
States. On 21 August, Ambassador Hurley, noting that “Mao Tze Tung
[Zedong] and his party do seem to be fearful about what may happen to
them,” offered, through the head of the U.S. forces in China, Albert C.
Wedemeyer, that he would fly to Yan’an to escort Mao to Chongqing on the
same plane.34 Mao agreed, cabling Wedemeyer on the 24th to send Hurley to
Yan’an.35 Hurley’s presence would make it unlikely that Chiang would order
the plane shot down. Hurley, accompanied by a senior KMT official, Zhang
Zhizhong, flew to Chongqing on 27 August. On 28 August, Mao and his
28. Hu Qiaomu, Hu Qiaomu Huiyi Mao Zedong, p. 82.
29. Pang Xianzhi, Mao Zedong Nianpu, 1893–1949 (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1993), pp. 11, 15.
30. Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 1898–1949, p. 630.
31. Petr Vladimirov (Vlasov), Osobyi Raion Kitaya, 1942–45 (Moscow: APN, 1977). The so-called
Vladimirov diaries are at least in part a forgery, though this particular point is supported by other
evidence.
32. Ibid.
33. See Liu Shaoqi’s report on his conversation with Stalin in Moscow on 27 July 1949, in Jianguo
Yilai Liu Shaoqi Wengao (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 2005), Vol. 1, p. 40.
34. Patrick J. Hurley’s cable, 21 August 1945, in University of Oklahoma, Patrick J. Hurley Papers,
Box 96, Folder 11.
35. Cable, US Observer Group (Yan’an) to Albert Wedemeyer, 24 August 1945, in University of
Oklahoma, Patrick J. Hurley Papers, Box 96, Folder 12.
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small party were seen off at the Yan’an airstrip by senior cadres and the com-
munity of foreigners. Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, reportedly broke into sobs, as if
not expecting to see him again, and Mao himself looked “as if he was going to
his execution.”36 He arrived in Chongqing the same day, driving away from
the airfield in the same car with Hurley, even though Chiang had sent a dif-
ferent car to pick him up.37 The Generalissimo penned a scathing assessment
in his diary: “This affair is most ridiculous. The Communist bandits are so
shameless and chicken-hearted [wuchiwudan]. Three days ago the Commu-
nist newspapers and radio almost daily denounced Hurley as a reactionary and
an imperialist and now they want him to be the guarantor [of Mao’s safety].”38
Talk-Talk, Fight-Fight
Mao Zedong’s agreement to hold talks with Chiang offers an interesting angle
on one of the most debated aspects of CCP foreign policy: the role of ideol-
ogy. Mao never made a secret of his intention to pursue a socialist revolution
in China: This was a consistent theme of his writings before 1945. Although
socialism per se was deemed far off, the idea of “new democracy,” as outlined
in Mao’s speech to the Seventh Party Congress, was a more immediate task.
The CCP’s push for a rapid expansion of the “liberated areas” in the imme-
diate days after Japan surrendered was an effort to put the Communists in
a position to dictate the terms of national reconciliation to the KMT. These
plans were frustrated in both military and political terms. But the change of
direction in August 1945 did not mean that the revolutionary goals were be-
ing abandoned. The long-term goals remained the same, but their realization
was being postponed to an uncertain future. As Zhou Enlai put it at the CCP
Politburo meeting on 23 August, “the goal of the realization of new democ-
racy in China has not changed. In the future there will be a new revolutionary
high tide. We will prepare to welcome it.”39
36. Cited in Andrei Ledovskii, SSSR i Stalin v Sud’bakh Kitaya (Moscow: Pamyatniki Istoricheskoi
Mysli, 1999), p. 200, on the basis of a TASS report, 28 August 1945, in AVPRF, Fond (F.) 56, Opis’
(Op.) 6, Papka (P.) 47, Delo (D.) 67, Listy (Ll.) 11–12. The same passage is cited in Vladimirov,
Osobyi Raion Kitaya, p. 648, suggesting that the “diary” was at least in part based on TASS bulletins.
See also Dieter Heinzig, The Soviet Union and Communist China, p. 442 n. 168.
37. William Morwood, Duel for the Middle Kingdom: The Struggle between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao
Tse-tung for Control of China (New York: Everest House, 1968), p. 7.
38. Shilüe Gaoben, Vol. 62, pp. 347–348 (entry for 26 August 1945). The same passage is cited in
Furuya Keiji, Chiang Kai-shek: His Life and Times (New York: St. John’s University, 1981), p. liii, but
the translation is imprecise.
39. Zhou Enlai Junshi Huodong Jishi, Vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 2000), p. 605.
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Mao and Zhou had a heated conversation about this future with Wede-
meyer, whom they met in Chongqing. Wedemeyer questioned the Chinese
leaders about whether the CCP could achieve the goals embodied in Sun Yat-
sen’s Three Principles of the Peoples without recourse to a “foreign ideology.”
Zhou replied that the CCP would have to rely on the Soviet Union and the
working class of the United States, Great Britain, and other Western coun-
tries. Mao, who was listening to the conversation through a female interpreter,
added at this point: “Chinese revolution is an integral part of world revolu-
tion against imperialism, feudalism, and capitalism. . . . [W]e want to help
our people who are so ignorant and backward to become educated, civilized,
and progressive.”
Wedemeyer explained that although Communist goals may sound hu-
manitarian, their realization was invariably accompanied by relentless brutal-
ity. Zhou, Wedemeyer reported,
was obviously aroused by my remarks, because he burst forth in Chinese. Then,
realizing that I did not understand, he returned rather haltingly to English, try-
ing to find the correct words to refute my statements. He emphasized that the
power of the reactionary forces in the world was so great that the common peo-
ple were compelled to resort to any means in order to accomplish the overthrow
of their deadly enemies.40
Wedemeyer recalled later,
I had heard many times that they were not true Marxists but were simply agrar-
ian reformers interested in the welfare of the Chinese people. However, this his-
toric meeting under informal circumstances gave the lie to such reports, which
were being widely disseminated in the United States. I recorded this provocative
discussion immediately after my Chinese Communist guests had departed.41
Wedemeyer’s British colleague, Adrian Carton de Wiart, who was Winston
Churchill’s personal envoy to Chiang, had a similar impression after meet-
ing Mao and Zhou just after their arrival in Chongqing. Mao, he felt, was
“uncompromising” and “quite a good type of man but a fanatic.” “If the Gen-
eralissimo can effect a compromise with him,” Carton de Wiart wrote to Lon-
don on 6 September, “I shall be more than surprised.”42 He later recounted
how he was “asked by several eminent people” to persuade Chiang to stop
fighting with the Communists. But, Carton de Wiart wrote,
40. Albert Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! (New York: Holt, 1958), pp. 285–287.
41. Ibid., p. 287.
42. Adrian Carton de Wiart to Esmay, 5 September 1945, in Bodleian Library, Oxford University,
Attley Papers. The author is grateful to Sheng Peng for help in obtaining this document.
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The Generalissimo was aware that my own personal feelings were different and
that I felt that there was only one answer to the Communists, and that was
defeat. To me the right time for negotiations is after victory when, backed by
force, words seem to attain a meaning not so well understood before.43
Carton de Wiart, at least in retrospect, sided with Chiang in his complaints
that the untimely U.S. pressure for peace talks derailed the KMT from defeat-
ing the Communists who, in any case, did not understand any language other
than force.
Wedemeyer, too, in retrospect spelled out what he felt was wrong with
U.S. policy, namely, a naïve belief that the Chinese Communists were sim-
ply “reformers” and would therefore come to terms with a Kuomintang gov-
ernment that, many observers readily agreed, was sorely in need of reform.
Whether Wedemeyer believed so consistently or (as with many others) was
wise only in retrospect, the key issue was that the United States should have
recognized the CCP for the revolutionary party that it was and, relinquishing
a priori unrealizable hopes of a CCP-KMT détente, should have offered more
direct and active support to Chiang. This is all part of the argument in the
broader “who lost China” debate, one of the most acrimonious debates of U.S.
foreign policy.
The prevailing scholarly consensus on this debate is that Wedemeyer
was right insofar as CCP leaders really were Communists and not agrar-
ian reformers. The Chinese revolution had its own internal dynamic that
was quite separate from anything the United States did or failed to do. The
United States, the argument goes, could neither prevent the Communist vic-
tory in China nor avoid the break in relations between the Communists and
the United States.44 There was, in other words, no “lost chance” in the re-
lationship. This may be true, but the question should also be considered
from a different angle: lost chance for what, precisely? The Chinese Com-
munists were ideologically committed to the cause of the revolution, and
U.S. policymakers clearly misjudged the situation in hoping that the con-
flict between the CCP and the KMT could be reduced to “political contro-
versy” or, as the head of the U.S. Observer Group in Yan’an, Ivan Yeaton,
reported on the day of Mao’s departure for Chongqing, that the CCP’s “long
and short range aim is a true coalition government which allows them free
43. Adrian Carton de Wiart, Happy Odyssey (London: Jonathan Cape, 1950).
44. See, for instance, “Rethinking the Lost Chance in China: A Symposium,” with John Garver,
Michael M. Sheng, Odd Arne Westad, and Chen Jian and an introduction by Warren I. Cohen,
in Diplomatic History, Vol. 21, No.1 (Winter 1997), pp. 71–115.
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competition.”45 Mao’s unwillingness to abandon revolutionary goals implied
that the CCP would not lay down arms and become just another political
party, freely competing for the future of China from the podium of the Na-
tional Assembly. But this does not mean that accommodation was impossible
or that Mao was resolved to fight it out with Chiang, and that the peace talks
were just a diversionary maneuver. The available evidence suggests that this
was not what Mao had in mind when he went to Chongqing. What, then,
did he have in mind?
Mao’s intentions can be discerned from the discussions at the highest lev-
els of the CCP and from orders issued to CCP military commanders. At a
Politburo meeting on 26 August, Mao outlined three “concessions” the CCP
would be willing to make. The first was to yield [rangchu] the area between
Guangdong and Hunan provinces in southern China.46 The second was to
yield all the areas south of the Yangtze River, and the third—the bottom
line—was to leave the areas north of the Yangtze River up to the Longhai
railway, the major artery that ran from Lianyungang in the east to Xi’an in the
west.47 Mao counted on having control of the areas between the Longhai rail-
way and Manchuria, which would mean effective division of the country into
two parts, the north and the south. However, the status of Manchuria itself,
then controlled by the Soviet army, was uncertain. The CCP was in a good
position to contemplate a takeover, unless actively barred by Soviet forces.
In April–May 1945 Mao reportedly had contemplated sending 150,000–
200,000 troops to Manchuria to fight alongside the Soviet army in the coming
liberation.48 These plans came to nothing because the Soviet Union had no
intention to involve CCP forces in anything of the kind. Chiang, too, eyed
the northeast, preparing a rapid deployment of forces to establish KMT con-
trol over big cities and lines of communications. Still, the situation permitted
the CCP to “contend” with the Nationalists for control of one of the most
resource-rich and industrially developed parts of China. On 26 August the
Politburo agreed to begin quiet infiltration of Communist troops and cadres
to the three Manchurian provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning.49
45. Telegram, Yan’an (probably Ivan Yeaton) to Patrick J. Hurley, 27 August 1945, in University of
Oklahoma, Patrick J. Hurley Papers, Box 97, Folder 3.
46. All Chinese-language materials refer to Henan (much further north) rather than to Hunan. Hunan
makes much more sense, as already pointed out by Chen and Zhang, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy,
p. 32 n. 66.
47. Zhou Enlai Nianpu, p. 630; and Mao Zedong Nianpu, p. 15.




The reasons for this decision are still not clear. The record of the meeting
on 26 August has still not been made public. All we have are snippets of
information, such as comments from Central Committee Secretary Ren Bishi:
As I see it, our control of the Northeast is a guarantee that peace in the Far East
will be preserved. Capturing the Northeast is a problem of utmost importance.
If we capture it, we can bring revolution nearer by a few years. If we don’t, we’ll
postpone the revolution by a few years. One can say that the Northeast will
decide the fate of the Chinese revolution, so the capture of the Northeast is a
question of priority. If we lose some of the other places, that’s no big deal.50
Comments such as these can be read retrospectively as evidence that the CCP
leaders already intended to wage the civil war by using Manchuria as the base
(a strategy that ultimately paid off ), but in August 1945 this future still ap-
peared highly uncertain. The move into the northeast was thus largely op-
portunistic, occasioned by the CCP leaders’ belief that the Sino-Soviet Treaty
could yet be turned to the advantage of the CCP—that it was, as Zhou Enlai
put it during that day’s discussion, “in the interest of the people” (i.e., the
Communists).
The CCP’s expectations can be inferred from the Central Committee’s in-
struction dated 29 August, “Enter the Northeast and Control the Vast Rural
Areas.”51 The instruction acknowledged that under the Sino-Soviet Treaty the
Soviet army would hand control in Manchuria to the KMT government (on
28 August Moscow published an agreement with the Nationalists to this ef-
fect) and noted that the Soviet Union had vowed not to interfere in China’s in-
ternal politics.52 In addition, an article published in the 28 August issue of the
Soviet military daily Krasnaya Zvezda proclaimed that the Soviet Union would
support China’s “democratic” development.53 Given that “democratic” was a
Soviet euphemism for Communist or pro-Communist elements, CCP leaders
had reason to believe that as long as the party’s penetration of Manchuria re-
mained low-key and did not explicitly contradict the terms of the Sino-Soviet
Treaty, Soviet forces would treat CCP units with “great sympathy.”54
50. Tian Xuan et al., Jiefang Zhanzheng Quanjilu (Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin Chubanshe, 1999),
pp. 97–98. Here and elsewhere page numbers refer to the electronic version of the book.
51. The full text is in Chen and Zhang, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, pp. 33–34.
52. For the text of the agreement and various drafts discussed in the course of Sino-Soviet negotiations,
see AVPRF, F. 06, Op. 7, D. 512, P. 36, Ll. 1–17.
53. The article is summarized in FRUS, 1945, Vol. 7, pp. 454–455, and is also mentioned in the in-
struction. This was the formulation Stalin intended to introduce in a joint statement on the conclusion
of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, but he dropped it in the face of resistance from Soong.
54. Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji, Vol. 15, p. 257.
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A great deal of uncertainty about Soviet intentions remained, however.
Because the CCP was unsure about the situation in the Northeast or about
Soviet intentions, CCP officials believed they should quietly expand into the
area “as long as the Red Army remains silent and does not resolutely oppose
our actions.”55 The CCP’s initial decision was to send 50,000 troops (and
10,000 cadres) to Manchuria. In Zhu De’s estimate in late August, it would
take at least half a year for Chiang’s forces to reach the northeast, so the op-
portunity was clearly there.56 Speaking to the departing cadres on 28 Au-
gust, Zhu De said they would have to engage in “arduous work” to struggle
for the 30 million people of Manchuria: “We have a great hope: to turn the
Northeast into a Democratic Northeast.”57 Zhu’s remarks were echoed by Liu
Shaoqi: “we’ll have to see the situation. If there is space, we will get in.”58 This
way, Liu explained, the CCP would gain “capital” for peace talks with the
Kuomintang.59
Another way of gaining “capital” was Mao’s decision to intensify military
operations. On 22 August he issued instructions for CCP forces in Shan-
dong and Central China to “annihilate” 40,000–50,000 Kuomintang troops
in each theater: “If you are able to fight several good battles of elimination
in Shandong and Central China, this will have a big influence on the en-
tire situation.”60 On 29 August Liu Shaoqi reiterated to the command of the
New Fourth Army the importance of fighting a few large battles of “complete
annihilation.” “This would help internal peace and the present peace talks,”
Liu argued. Similar instructions were also issued for the Jinjiyu base area (at
the convergence of Shanxi, Henan, and Hebei provinces) to deliver a heavy
blow against the advancing forces of KMT General Yan Xishan. When the
CCP commander, Liu Bocheng, and his political commissar, Deng Xiaoping,
were departing for the base area on 26 August, Mao told them to “fight full-
heartedly.” “Don’t worry about the question of my safety in Chongqing. The
better you fight, the safer I will be, and the better the talks will be. There is no
55. Ibid., p. 258.
56. Tian Xuan et al., Jiefang Zhanzheng Quanjilu, p. 101.
57. Zhu De Nianpu, censor’s version (manuscript), in the author’s possession, p. 446.
58. Tian Xuan et al., Jiefang Zhanzheng Quanjilu, p. 102.
59. Liu Chongwen, ed., Liu Shaoqi Nianpu, 1898–1969 (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe,
1996), p. 481.
60. Mao Zedong’s cable to the New Fourth Army, Shandong Military District, and the Jinpu frontline,




other way.”61 Or, as Mao explained to another set of cadres at about the same
time,
If you fight well on the front-line, I will be a little safer. If you don’t fight well, I
will be in greater danger. If you achieve a victory, I will find it somewhat easier
to talk—otherwise, somewhat more difficult.62
Mao called this strategy “fight-fight, talk-talk.” Large-scale fighting in what
became known as the Shangdang campaign began two weeks after Mao’s ar-
rival in Chongqing.
It is of course possible, to view Mao’s strategy in a cynical vein, as some
historians have done. By fighting selected “battles of annihilation,” Mao was,
in this view, merely trying to protect himself in Chongqing by showing Chi-
ang that even in his absence the CCP was a serious fighting force.63 But
although partly true, such a conclusion is simplistic. Mao’s projected “con-
cessions” regarding “liberated areas” south of the Longhai railway, taken to-
gether with his instructions to “annihilate” tens of thousands of enemy troops
in strategic battles in the Jinjiyu base area, Central China, and Shandong,
as well as the CCP’s opportunistic and open-ended infiltration of the north-
east clearly suggest what idea Mao brought to the negotiations in Chongqing:
the division of China. Although in the long term he and other CCP leaders
thought in terms of revolution, actual realization of this revolution was being
indefinitely postponed. In the face of internal challenges (Chiang Kai-shek’s
rapid moves to consolidate power in the Japanese-occupied regions) and ex-
ternal pressure (exemplified by Stalin’s unexpected betrayal of the CCP cause),
Mao had to hunker down for the long haul, and the only realistic way of doing
so was to consolidate CCP control in northern China, best with Manchuria
but quite possibly without. Saying that these were just temporary measures
before Mao’s bid for power in all of China underestimates the severity of the
CCP’s difficulties as it suddenly found itself on the defensive. Ideology mat-
tered, but Mao’s decision to travel to Chongqing shows that it was not the
only factor in play. Here, as at other turning points of his career, Mao proved
to be much more of a realist than both his admirers and his detractors were
willing to allow.
61. As described by Liu Bocheng in a speech to Jinjiyu cadres, in Liu Bocheng Zhuan, censor’s version,
in the author’s possession, p. 340.
62. Xiao Jinguan, Xiao Jinguan Huiyilu (Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1987), p. 325.
63. This is the argument made, for instance, in John Halliday and Jun Chang, Mao: The Unknown
Story.
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Northern and Southern Dynasties
China’s 5,000-year history is replete with examples of national division.
“United China,” as a modern nation state, was a shared project of the KMT
and CCP. Both aspired to national unity, on their own terms. In 1945, how-
ever, national unity as a cause was much dearer to Chiang than to Mao. In
the days before Mao’s arrival in Chongqing, Chiang also developed a strategy
for the forthcoming parley, a strategy that hinged on the CCP’s agreement to
surrender control over its armies to the KMT, which would then “reorganize”
them. As a quid pro quo, Chiang was willing to end the years of KMT tute-
lage and embrace “constitutional government,” which, for the initial period
at least, would still be controlled by the KMT, even if the CCP and other
parties were able to appoint the heads of some of the ministries. In a fur-
ther concession, the CCP and other parties could elect additional deputies to
the existing National Assembly (as long as the number of these deputies did
not exceed those of the KMT). This way, Chiang surmised, not only would
the opposition parties be able to participate in the government (with overall
Kuomintang control) but also “in the eyes of the British and the Americans I
would indeed abandon party rule and tend toward the democratic system.”64
The bottom line for Chiang was that the CCP would have to recognize the
“unity of military command and political authority.”65
Mao had a very different approach. The CCP’s official position, con-
taining eleven points, was presented to the KMT on 3 September. Some of
these points were couched as important concessions. For instance, the CCP
promised to abide by the manifesto of the KMT’s First National Conven-
tion in pursuing peaceful reconstruction on the basis of the Three Principles
of the Peoples (point one) and pledged “loyal support of the leadership of
President Chiang Kai-shek” (point two). The more important points, how-
ever, were buried deeper in the text. These included (under point nine) the
proposition that the CCP be allowed to nominate the governors of Shanxi,
Shandong, Hebei, Rehe, and Chahar provinces and (under point ten) the
proposition that CCP armies be maintained at 48 divisions, stationed north
of the Longhai railway and in the Huai River Valley (northern Jiangsu
and northern Anhui).66 The latter provision was quite clearly a negotiating
ploy: Mao was already reconciled to withdrawing CCP forces to northern
64. Cited in Yang Kuisong, Shiqu de jihui (Beijing: Xinxing Chubanshe, 2010), p. 244.




China. He spelled out his tactic to Soviet Ambassador Apollon Petrov on
6 September:
We know ahead of time that many of our demands will not be accepted by the
Kuomintang and we are prepared to make concessions. We, however, will do
everything to defend our positions. And if we have to retreat, we will strive to do
so slowly and with great resistance. Concessions are possible only on the main
condition that our core interests will not be harmed. We will not retreat from
the line, behind which our vital interests begin.67
The 3rd of September was Victory Day—for Chiang, a bittersweet moment.
The war the country had fought for eight long years under his leadership was
over at last—but at what cost? Moreover, the prospects of national unifica-
tion were clouded by the stubborn resistance of “Mao the Commie” (Gong
Mao), as Chiang unkindly referred to his nemesis in his diary. “On this day
of victory in which the multitudes are rejoicing, Mao the Commie . . . makes
insatiable demands,” Chiang wrote. “I have treated him with utmost sincerity,
yet he goes so far as to use my sincerity to demand appointment of his people
as governors for five northern provinces and the chair of the Beiping military
headquarters. . . . The Communist bandits are impervious to reason. This
matter can be resolved only by relying on God’s strength. It is exceedingly
painful.”68 During their first substantial meeting the previous day, Chiang
had told Mao that his demands were “impossible to carry out,” even as he
promised to invite individual members of the CCP “on the basis of their abil-
ity and merit” to participate in the government and even become governors
of provinces.69
After this somewhat unhappy start, Mao and Chiang distanced them-
selves from negotiations, which were carried on by Zhou and Wang Ruofei
for the CCP and by Zhang Zhizhong (former governor of Xinjiang), Zhang
Qun (governor of Sichuan), and Chiang’s associate Shao Lizi for the KMT,
with the occasional participation of other KMT officials. The gulf between
the two sides was made apparent at the first meeting, on 4 September. Shao
Lizi explained that only two of Zhou Enlai’s eleven points (those concern-
ing recognition of Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership and Sun Yat-sen’s Principles
of the Peoples) were any good. As for the rest, “there is basically nothing to
67. Memorandum of conversation between Apollon Petrov and Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Wang
Ruofei, 6 September 1945, in AVPRF, F. 0100, Op. 33, D. 13, P. 244, Ll. 220–240.
68. Shilüe Gaoben, Vol. 62, pp. 459–460.
69. Summarized in FRUS, 1945, Vol. VII, p. 313.
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discuss.”70 The most unacceptable part of the CCP position dealt with the
Communist troops and the idea of appointing Communist governors to
northern provinces. The KMT negotiators attacked both proposals as go-
ing against the basic idea of a modern nation-state. The terms “modern” and
“modernization” crept up repeatedly in the conversations, highlighting the
centrality of these concepts to the KMT postwar outlook. Zhang Zhizhong,
for instance, emphasized that a modern nation-state could not have a KMT
army any more than it could have a CCP army. China had to have a na-
tional army.71 Zhang Qun questioned the whole idea of having separate CCP-
controlled provinces, with their own laws and regulations, as fundamentally
incompatible with the idea of national unity.72 Zhang called the whole pro-
posed arrangement “feudal,” and Shao Lizi intimated that the Communists
wanted to divide China into “northern and southern dynasties,” which, to be
sure, was exactly the point.
Chiang continued to meet with Mao at dinners and similar social func-
tions, maintaining an outward display of civility. In private he was absolutely
furious, venting his anger and dismay in diary entries. Chiang had struggled
for years to unite China by subduing its many warlords. He had refused to
bow to Japanese pressure and clawed his way to final victory in the Sino-
Japanese war. But now, in the hour of triumph, his revolution was incom-
plete. The state was still divided. The Communist problem was only one of
his many headaches. Equally disconcerting was the Soviet problem, for, in
spite of Stalin’s assurances, Chiang was far from certain that Soviet forces, who
were then in full control in Manchuria, would ever pack up and go home. An
additional problem was the ongoing rebellion in Xinjiang. Although Stalin
had already decided to cut off support for the rebels, Chiang continued to
suspect foul play. He was also worried that Stalin would break his promise
not to support the Communists, his doubts in this regard fed by intelligence
reports of the CCP delegates in Chongqing boasting about their close links
with Stalin and their resolve to capture Manchuria with the quiet acquies-
cence of the Soviet occupation authorities.73 Then there was the problem of
U.S. (and British) meddling, including the pressure from “confused” people
70. Discussion between the KMT and the CCP delegations, 4 September 1945, in Zhonghua Minguo
Zhongyao Shiliao Chubian, Vol. 7 (2) (Taipei: Zhongguo guo min dang zhong yang wei yuan hui dang
shi wei yuan hui, 1981), p. 47.
71. Discussion between the KMT and the CCP delegations, 8 September 1945, in Zhongyao Shiliao,
Vol. 7 (2), p. 58.
72. Discussion between the KMT and the CCP delegations, 4 September 1945, p. 49.
73. Shilüe Gaoben, Vol. 62, pp. 518–519.
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like Ambassador Hurley to come to terms with Mao. “Humiliation,” Chiang
wrote, speaking of his experience with the Soviet Union, the United States,
Great Britain, and the CCP; “it is like an old tree being cut down by four
axes.”74
Notions like “shame” and “humiliation” appear frequently in Chiang’s
diary, as do distinctions between “evil” and “virtuous.” These suggest that
Chiang regarded the project of building a modern nation-state in Confucian
terms, as a kind of a moral imperative. This recasting of the problem in moral
terms narrowed Chiang’s scope for compromise with Mao. Most importantly,
Chiang felt he held the upper hand in military terms, making it possible to
force the outcome he preferred. Still, “virtue” precluded Chiang from resorting
to more decisive action, such as assassinating his rival. “He is so evil, death
would be too good for him,” Chiang wrote of Mao on 20 September. “But
I still must tolerate [him] in the interest of the country, be guided by virtue,
hoping that he may repent.”75
This hope proved illusory in the end, premised as it was on the false no-
tion that Mao shared Chiang’s understanding of virtue. Mao had his own
revolution with its own notions of right and wrong. Although Mao and his
comrades, just like Chiang, were nominally committed to national unity, in
practice they exhibited considerable flexibility. Their north-south proposal,
correctly interpreted by Chiang as an effort to “divide the country into two
parts—two states,” was an effort to freeze the status quo, putting the CCP
into position to consolidate its power in the north while leaving the KMT in
control of the rest of China.76 This was unarguably a more realistic approach
at the time. One of the CCP negotiators, Wang Ruofei, repeatedly stressed
during the protracted talks that the only way to avoid a civil war was to “rec-
ognize realities.” The “reality” was that China was already divided, and this
division assured the CCP’s survival. No exaltations of virtue could compel
Mao to relinquish this bottom line.
The Endgame
Negotiations between the CCP and the KMT dragged on through September
and into early October 1945, with meager progress. Symbolic concessions
were being made by both sides, as with the KMT’s agreement to postpone the
74. Ibid., p. 471.
75. Ibid., pp. 618–619.
76. Conversation between Apollon Petrov and Chiang Chingkuo, 7 September 1945, in AVPRF, F.
0100, Op. 33, D. 13, P. 244, Ll. 226–229.
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convention of the National Assembly originally scheduled for 12 November,
an occasion that would go a long way toward bestowing Chiang with much-
needed “democratic” legitimacy and was for this reason much resented by
the CCP. The Communist negotiators in the meantime backed away from
their previous insistence on a coalition government, realizing (correctly) that
Chiang would never give up the levers of power. Perhaps the most dramatic
breakthrough of the talks was the agreement on the number of divisions that
the CCP would be allowed to have: from Mao’s insistence on 48 and Chiang’s
offer of 12, the two sides settled on 20, which was quite a bit lower than even
Mao’s original bottom line of 25. However, this alleged concession was not a
concession at all. As Mao explained to Soviet diplomats in Chongqing on 10
October, no matter how many divisions were allowed, the number of CCP
troops would stay as high as the Communists needed. They would simply
be reorganized into larger units.77 Despite making scant headway, the two
sides at last issued a joint communiqué on 10 October, “The Double Ten
Agreement.” The next day, Mao departed for Yan’an, “looking thinner than
when he arrived,” reported The New York Times. “The question about China
is optimistic,” Mao announced on departure, “There are difficulties but they
can be overcome.”78 He never saw Chiang again.
Such poor results had not been completely unexpected. The diplomatic
community in Chongqing was rife with predictions of a deadlock, because
(in the words of one head of mission) “these two people [Mao and Chiang]
have not only substantial political disagreements but also personal mistrust
and mutual dislike.”79 Among the more optimistic observers was U.S. Am-
bassador Hurley, who continued to believe, improbably late into the game,
that “the rapprochement between the two leading parties of China seems to
be progressing and the discussion and rumors of civil war recede as the confer-
ence continues.”80 But this was mainly because Hurley was himself so deeply
invested in the success of the Chongqing talks, crediting himself with bringing
Chiang and Mao to the negotiating table. Soviet officials, too, seemed keen to
see these talks to a fruitful conclusion. Stalin, whose pressure was instrumen-
tal in bringing Mao to Chongqing, appeared disappointed and even frustrated
77. Conversation between Apollon Petrov and Mao Zedong, 10 October 1945, in AVPRF, F. 0100,
Op. 40, D. 7, P. 248, Ll. 39–44.
78. Henry R. Lieberman, “Chunking, Reds in Limited Accord,” The New York Times, 11 October
1945, p. 3.
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that the talks came to nothing, telling Chiang’s son Chiang Chingkuo (whom
the elder Chiang had sent to Moscow in December 1945) that the Soviet gov-
ernment “does not proffer advice to the Chinese Communists. It is not happy
with their behavior. The Chinese Communists have not asked [the Soviets]
for advice.”81
Stalin was not entirely truthful here. In reality, Mao, Zhou, and Wang
asked their Soviet “friends” for advice and even instructions. As Mao put it
in a conversation with Ambassador Petrov, it was “fairly difficult for [CCP
members] to orient themselves as they are not clear about either the U.S. po-
sition or the USSR’s position in case of the outbreak of a civil war.” Petrov did
not go beyond the general recommendation to achieve compromise through
mutual concessions.82 Crucially, however, there is no evidence that Stalin ever
pressured the CCP to back away from its key demands. If anything, by De-
cember 1945 Stalin was voicing certain disappointment that Chiang did not
make greater concessions by allowing Communist governors for at least some
of the provinces.83 Stalin never explained how such administrative arrange-
ments would work with the idea of one government and one army, which, he
continued to insist, was important for China. His thinking on this point was
marred by contradictions, which Mao fully exploited.
Mao closely followed the direction of U.S.-Soviet relations in the fall of
1945. The nature of the queries he made to the Soviet ambassador suggests
he believed that the wartime partnership between Moscow and Washington
could not last much longer. The CCP’s internal instructions from this period
put stress on “friendly” cooperation with U.S. forces, but Mao had no doubt
that when push came to shove the United States would back the KMT against
the CCP. Mao got a taste of what he could expect when he was confronted in
Chongqing by Wedemeyer, who angrily demanded to know about the cir-
cumstances of the killing of the U.S. intelligence officer John Birch, who
was gunned down and mutilated by CCP troops near the town of Xuzhou
in Jiangsu Province. In a tense meeting on 30 August, Wedemeyer said he
wanted a “full explanation” of the incident, giving Mao until 10 September
81. Conversation between Stalin and Chiang Chingkuo, 30 December 1945, in Sovetsko-kitaiskie ot-
nosheniya, Vol. 4, Book 2, p. 331.
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to produce a “full written report.” Wedemeyer added that “as American com-
mander I am going to use whatever force is necessary to protect American
lives. I want to make this perfectly clear.”84
Mao was apologetic, but he was inclined to see U.S. troops as the CCP’s
enemy. One of the issues he, Zhou, and Wang raised with the Soviet ambas-
sador was what would happen if U.S. forces advanced north into Manchuria
(into Soviet-occupied areas). They also wanted to know whether Moscow
would help the CCP if it came under attack from KMT forces with U.S.
support and what the Soviet Union would do if U.S. troops directly attacked
the Communists, which was “the only thing,” according to Mao, “that the
CCP is worried about.”85 Petrov offered vague assurances that the United
States would not go that far but advised the Communists to avoid com-
ing into conflict with U.S. troops and to settle problems through friendly
negotiations. By raising this issue with Petrov, Mao was clearly testing the
ground for U.S.-Soviet frictions, but he also wanted to signal to Stalin that
the CCP could be relied on to resist U.S. and KMT encroachments in north-
ern China. If the Soviet Union backed Mao’s strategy of establishing con-
trol over the northern provinces and Manchuria, the CCP’s position would
be immeasurably strengthened. By mid-September 1945, when the Soviet
command established contacts with the CCP headquarters in Yan’an, it be-
came clear that Soviet forces, while not actively helping the Communists
in Manchuria, would at least turn a blind eye to their operations in the
countryside.86
The international situation was rapidly changing—and Mao knew it. The
key turning point was the London Conference of Foreign Ministers, which
overlapped with the Chongqing talks, running from 11 September to 3 Octo-
ber 1945. The conference soon ground to a halt because of disagreements over
the West’s recognition of pro-Soviet governments in Bulgaria and Romania,
Stalin’s demands for a base in the Mediterranean, and his resentment at being
effectively sidelined in the postwar occupation of Japan. Soviet leaders were
clearly concerned that U.S. officials would be tempted to deal with the Soviet
Union from a position of strength, reinforced by the U.S. nuclear monopoly.
An influential Soviet diplomat, Ivan Maiskii, told U.S. Ambassador Averell
Harriman that “the Soviet people think that as of late the Americans have
84. Minutes of Meeting Held at Ambassador Hurley’s Home, 30 August 1945, in University of Okla-
homa, Patrick J. Hurley Papers, Box 97, Folder 4.
85. Conversation between Petrov and Mao, 10 October 1945.
86. For a detailed discussion, see Yang, Mao Zedong yu Sidalin, pp. 230–231.
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become somewhat arrogant, and are not even trying to hide it.”87 Stalin’s re-
sponse to this perceived arrogance was, in his own words, to “display complete
obduracy.”88 This did not mean he was now resolved to provoke an open con-
frontation. But he became increasingly suspicious of potential U.S. encroach-
ments on Soviet interests in Europe and Asia.
One of Stalin’s main concerns in China was the impact of the U.S. “Open
Door” policy and whether it entailed a demand for access to Manchuria,
which the Soviet leader perceived to lie within his sphere of interest. The land-
ing of U.S. marines along the Tianjin-Beiping corridor and in Qingdao from
the end of September through mid-October 1945, highlighted the possibil-
ity of a U.S. military presence in the Chinese northeast, which Stalin deemed
unacceptable. On top of this, in early October the KMT requested Soviet per-
mission to land troops in Dalian on the Liaodong Peninsula, which projected
southward from Manchuria. The Soviet Union refused, fearing that a rapid
KMT military takeover could jeopardize Soviet gains in the region and po-
tentially bring in U.S. forces through the “Open Door.” In November 1945
an actual shootout took place between a U.S. reconnaissance plane and Soviet
fighters off Dalian, and isolated skirmishes took place between U.S. troops
and CCP forces in northern China.
A 75-page political report filed by Petrov in December 1945 went to great
lengths to highlight the perceived U.S. threat to Soviet interests in China.
Petrov noted that the aim of U.S. policy was to turn China into a market for
U.S. goods, while keeping it preindustrial and backward. The landing of U.S.
forces in northern China was interpreted as having three related aims: first,
to help the KMT defeat the CCP forces; second, to strengthen U.S. politi-
cal and economic positions in the area; third, to plant agents to undermine
the Soviet position in Manchuria. Petrov argued that Chiang was personally
committed to these aims because the KMT “owed huge sums of money to
America” and therefore had to subordinate his domestic and foreign policy
to U.S. imperialism. This stark analysis, which egregiously misconstrued the
dynamic of Chiang’s relations with Washington, suggests that Soviet officials
believed they were merely reacting to a hideous U.S.-KMT plot to under-
mine Moscow’s gains in the Far East. Petrov stressed the apparent change in
U.S. policy compared to just a few months earlier. Previously, Petrov wrote,
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the United States supported the idea of a coalition government, deemed it
possible to cooperate with political forces other than the KMT, and did not
fully commit to Chiang. But after Japan’s defeat, according to Petrov, “Chi-
ang Kai-shek and American military authorities engaged in a direct conspiracy
against the CCP.”89
In reaching these conclusions, Petrov relied extensively on intelligence
materials. His report makes clear, for instance, that he had access not just to
the highest level of discussions inside the KMT (where, predictably, Chiang
made clear that his purpose was to annihilate the CCP) but also, curiously
enough, to the correspondence between Hurley and the U.S. State Depart-
ment. After seeing Hurley’s cables to Washington, Petrov concluded there
had been a “conspiracy” between the United States and the KMT to destroy
the CCP. We do not know how Stalin reacted to such views or whether he
even saw Petrov’s report (it was circulated only as high up as Foreign Minister
Vyacheslav Molotov), but this way of thinking was very much in tune with
Stalin’s own dark view of the world. After the London fiasco, Stalin more than
ever suspected the United States of attempting to undercut Soviet interests.
He was just then preoccupied with what he saw as a U.S. effort to deny the
Soviet Union its legitimate rights in establishing the control mechanism for
postwar Japan, where, he raged, the Soviet Union “was not being treated as
an Ally” and had been reduced to “a piece of furniture.”90 Developments in
China seemed to fit the same worrying pattern.
In line with these changes of perceptions, Soviet policy on the ground
in Manchuria also began to change. From mid-September, the Soviet com-
mand in Manchuria facilitated the Communist takeover of certain strategic
areas. On 16 September, Soviet commanders informed Yan’an that once So-
viet occupation forces were withdrawn from Chahar and Suiyuan provinces,
they wanted the CCP to take control of the area. This was necessary for main-
taining a connection between the Soviet-Mongolian army and the CCP. The
CCP would be provided with weapons if it needed them.91 Soon—according
to Wang Ruofei, who mentioned this news to the Soviet intelligence opera-
tive Leonid Miklashevskii—the Communists were told they would be allowed
to take control over the entire region from Shenyang to Shanghaiguan, thus
89. Apollon Petrov, “Report on the Foreign Policy and Internal Political Situation in the Country,”
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effectively barring large-scale KMT entry to Manchuria via land routes. Wang
reported that the two sides (the CCP and the Soviet command) had agreed
to increase the Chinese Communist presence in the area to 250,000 troops
and that the CCP units in Shenyang had already been given fifteen thousand
rifles, fifteen pieces of artillery, and other weapons. All of that, Wang told
Miklashevskii, represented an improvement—at least in comparison to “the
Red Army’s [previously] insufficient help to the CCP forces.”92
This is not to say that Stalin threw all caution to the wind. He contin-
ued to play both sides, partly out of concern that excessive obstructionism on
Moscow’s part could give Chiang a pretext to accuse the Soviet Union of vio-
lating the Sino-Soviet Treaty. But a more important reason was that although
he did not trust the KMT or the United States, Stalin was also concerned
that by associating himself too closely with the CCP he could potentially be
dragged into a situation over which he had no control. This had become ap-
parent in early October, when U.S. marines in China skirmished with CCP
forces along their route of advance. One might think Stalin would have been
pleased with the Communist resistance to the U.S. forces, whose intentions
Stalin had every reason to suspect. But Stalin was deeply worried that these
skirmishes would somehow implicate the Soviet Union. To this end, on 16
November he ordered the Soviet command in Manchuria to halt military
withdrawal and assist the KMT takeover of large Manchurian cities. “When
the so called Communist regiments,” Stalin wrote on the telegram with an
unsteady hand, “approach to take over Changchun, Mukden [Shenyang] and
other locations, chase them away with force and do not allow them into these
locations. Keep in mind that these regiments want to drag us into a conflict
with the U.S.A., which we cannot allow.”93
Stalin’s position thus retained a degree of ambiguity even after relations
with the United States took a turn for the worse. By mid-autumn of 1945 he
had moved away from the uncompromising views he had held as recently as
August, when he pressured Mao into negotiating with the KMT. The changes
in his position were caused by perceived U.S. encroachments on Soviet posi-
tions in China, and one wonders in retrospect how things would have played
out if the United States had been less eager to be seen projecting force close to
Stalin’s sphere of interest. One could object to this by saying that, actually, the
U.S. presence in northern China was extremely limited and its objectives there
92. Conversation between Leonid MIklashevskii and Wang Ruofei, 8 October 1945, in AVPRF, F.
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were more benign than the likes of Petrov imagined them to be (the main goal
was to accept Japan’s surrender rather than to fight someone else’s civil war).
The irony is that although the token U.S. presence in northern China did
little to help Chiang in beating the Communists, it did more than enough to
arouse Soviet suspicions. Still, the slide toward the Cold War was gradual, and
the U.S.-Soviet relationship even enjoyed a short-lived improvement toward
the end of the year, although the general trajectory remained negative.
With the Cold War logic increasingly making itself felt, Mao had reasons
to believe that Stalin’s pressure, which brought him to Chongqing in the first
place, would abate. Of all the players in this multilayered drama, Stalin was
the one who had the leverage to force Mao to yield to Chiang’s demands. But
Mao was only as adamant in Chongqing as Soviet leaders themselves had been
in London—in fact, Mao proved far more flexible. As he told Petrov on 10
October, when asked about the results of his talks with Chiang, “one cannot
say that they are good. But one cannot also not say that they are perfectly bad.
The results are a little better compared to the London conference of [foreign]
ministers.”94 What could Stalin have said to that? The Soviet leader could
certainly still deny the CCP entry into Manchuria, as well as the provinces of
Suiyuan, Chahar, and Rehe. He could also transfer all of Manchuria to the
CCP. Instead, Stalin tried to navigate a middle road. But even this ambiguous
position was a blessing to the Communists, for it gave the CCP a much-
needed breathing space.95
Conclusion
Was a chance for peace lost in the fall of 1945, and, if so, who was responsi-
ble? During a one-on-one conversation, Chiang made a passionate appeal to
his rival: “The fate of the country is in our hands . . . if we cannot come to
an agreement between ourselves, we will be committing a crime before future
generations.”96 But Mao and Chiang approached their talks from incompat-
ible angles. Chiang, driven by a commitment to modernization, could not
contemplate a return to the past, ideologically or emotionally. Chiang had led
China on a long struggle to unity, bringing the country together by military
94. Conversation between Petrov and Mao, 10 October 1945.
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force and political acumen, only to lose it to the Japanese. The end of the Sec-
ond World War seemingly put national unity within Chiang’s grasp, blocked
only by the Soviet menace in the north and the Soviet-sponsored CCP. Having
struck a bargain with Stalin by renouncing Outer Mongolia and agreeing to
special Soviet gains in the northeast, Chiang believed he could force the Com-
munists to abandon their “liberated areas” and give up their army. Anything
less was unacceptable to Chiang. Having realized that “Mao the Commie” did
not share these aspirations, Chiang rapidly moved to reassert military control
in northern China and especially Manchuria, cursing U.S. officials for their
“ignorance” and insufficient support.97 Even with insufficient U.S. support,
though, Chiang felt he could achieve complete victory.
Mao’s game was altogether different. He initially planned for swift con-
solidation of power in the Japanese-occupied areas, including in central and
southern China, but these plans mostly failed, as Chiang successfully pre-
vented the CCP from taking over Japanese or “puppet” forces or Japanese
weapons. More ominously, signals from Moscow made clear that Stalin
wanted to avoid a civil war in China at all costs. He did not believe in the
possibility of Communist success and feared that an outright civil war would
jeopardize Soviet gains in China. Stalin leaned on Mao to engage in peace
talks, and Mao, ever the pragmatist, flew to Chongqing. What he offered
to Chiang was the division of China. Such division went against the notion
of national unity, which was why Chiang immediately rejected it. For Mao,
however, it represented a realistic chance of consolidating the CCP position
and averting a civil war that, at this point, he could very well lose. The CCP
turned to “defending in the South, advancing in the North,” the military
counterpart of the political aims Mao pursued in Chongqing. As the pressure
from Moscow lessened after the London Council of Foreign Ministers meet-
ing, Mao thought he could count on direct Soviet assistance, which was what
he ultimately got in Manchuria, albeit not quite to the extent he hoped for.
Stalin conceded by December 1945 that allowing Communist governors “for
some provinces” was a good idea, as close as he ever came to endorsing Mao’s
scheme for the division of China.98
From Mao’s perspective, the division of China was just a temporary step,
another stage in revolutionary struggle. Like Chiang, Mao was driven by ide-
ological considerations. But unlike Chiang, Mao did not see national unity as
the most urgent task. The most urgent task was the survival and consolidation
97. On U.S. “ignorance,” see Shilüe Gaoben, Vol. 62, entry for 20 September 1945.
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of the CCP-controlled areas. Mao was not an agrarian reformer who could be
coaxed into a coalition government with Chiang in which he would exer-
cise no real power. But he was also not a fanatic who would plunge himself
into the purifying flames of a national revolution without any regard for the
balance of internal and external forces. Instead, Mao was a pragmatist who
believed that the best chance for the long-term survival of the Communist
project was in dividing the mountain, letting the two tigers roam freely in
their own domains in preparation for a potential showdown down the road.
It was impossible to tell when that showdown would come. If Chiang was not
so keen to go on the offensive against the Communists, it might have never
come. China would have been left divided but arguably on terms much more
favorable to Chiang than to his hated rival.
The broader question that emerges from consideration of these events is
exactly what to make of Mao’s legacy. In the Chinese historiography, Mao
invariably comes across as a “patriot” and a “revolutionary,” which makes it
difficult to contemplate that in 1945 he actually favored something as un-
patriotic and even “feudal” (to use Zhang Zhizhong’s term) as the division
of China. This ideological casting of Mao finds echoes in the Western his-
toriography, in the shape of the scholarly consensus that there was no “lost
chance” with Mao or with China. The “lost chance” thesis looks primarily
at U.S.-China relations and more at 1948–1949 than at 1945. This article
shows that the scope of the debate needs to be expanded. If we regard Mao
as a revolutionary fanatic in 1945, the same logic also applies to 1948–1949.
All the arguments are nicely aligned on the ideological compass, pointing in
only one direction: revolution, liberation, Communism. This may well be so,
but such an approach ignores Mao’s remarkable ability to postpone or even
abandon his revolutionary agendas, an ability that was evident in 1945 but
also characterized his policies well into the 1970s, with the U.S.-China rap-
prochement as the most obvious example. The issue was not that Mao ran
out of “revolutionary steam” by 1972 but that his “revolutionary” agenda was
severely circumscribed by pragmatic considerations—in 1972 no less than in
1945.
One can perhaps dispute this conclusion by citing a well-known Maoist
maxim: “despising the enemy strategically while taking full account of him
tactically.” By this account, Mao’s willingness to come to an accommodation
in 1945 (by dividing China) was but a tactical ploy: His long-term strategy
was something else entirely. This argument, however, does not hold because it
reads history backward, projecting what we know about certain consequences
of Mao’s actions back on to decisions that led to these consequences. Mao
himself liked to engage in such backward reading of history, crediting himself
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with great foresight, though many of his decisions in 1945 were dictated by
immediate circumstances rather than by long-term strategy. But even if we
permit an element of strategy in Mao’s thinking—so what? Where is the line
that divides tactics from strategy, and when does one move from tactical gains
to strategic outcomes—perhaps, using another of Mao’s favorite maxims, in
ten thousand years?
Taking this discussion to a yet broader plane, it all comes back to ideol-
ogy. In the 1990s, historians of the Cold War highlighted the importance of
ideological imperatives after the opening of the archives confirmed that poli-
cymakers on the “other” side of the Iron Curtain actually believed their own
revolutionary propaganda. Whether with Mao, ever standing up on behalf of
the Chinese people, or with Nikita Khrushchev and his comrades feeling like
boys about the Cuban revolution, or with Leonid Brezhnev supporting revo-
lutionary undertakings in the Third World because Karl Marx said so, or with
Fidel Castro and Che Guevara waging brave jungle wars for noble ends, the
New Cold War historiography seemingly embraced Cold War revolutionar-
ies as, well, revolutionaries. The rest was tactics. Such an embrace, however,
comes with the danger of buying into self-serving revolutionary discourses
and, as a result, failing to understand that even the most revolutionary ideas
in the most revolutionary minds, even as they shape the world, are also shaped
by the encounter with the world, and that this process of shaping while be-
ing shaped (rather than a prepacked luggage of “ideas”) accounts for policy
outcomes, and for chances taken and lost.
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